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Abstract
Evidence indicates that trade costs are a much more substantial barrier to trade than
tariffs, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. We decompose trade costs into (a) trade
facilitation; (b) non-tariff barriers and (c) the costs of business services. We develop
a conceptually innovative model and new dataset to assess deep integration
to reduce these three types of trade costs in the East African Community, the
Common Market of East and Southern Africa and South African Development
Community (EAC-COMESA-SADC) ‘Tripartite’ Free Trade Area (FTA), within the EAC
alone and unilaterally by the EAC. We ﬁnd that there are substantial gains for all six of
our African regions from deep integration in the Tripartite FTA or comparable unilat-
eral reforms by the EAC; but the estimated gains vary considerably across countries
and depend on the reform. Thus, countries would have an interest in negotiating for
different reforms in different agreements. Tariff removal in the Tripartite FTA would
produce only small losses or gains, depending on the country. Interestingly, we esti-
mate that Kenya gains less from comparable unilateral liberalisation by the EAC than
from the Tripartite FTA, due in part to an umbrella of protection in services markets in
the Tripartite region.
Key words: trade facilitation, services liberalisation, regional integration, Tripartite Free Trade, East
African Community, foreign direct investment
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1. Introduction
Evidence is now substantial that with the progressive global decline in tariffs over several
decades, trade costs are often a much more substantial barrier to trade than tariffs.1
Moreover, trade costs are especially high in sub-Saharan Africa compared with other
regions in the world. For example, the World Economic Forum (2012) found that it is still
considerably more expensive to trade with Africa than with other regions, and, in many
1 See, for example, Hummels et al. (2007) or Hummels and Schaur (2013).
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cases, the cost of trading is a more important obstacle to trade development than trade
policies.2
Countries in Eastern and Southern Africa, however, are attempting to address the high
trade costs through regional initiatives. Notably, the proposed 26 member country
Tripartite Free Trade Area (Tripartite FTA) (among the East African Community (EAC),
the Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and South African
Development Community (SADC)) has programmes in place for trade and transport facilita-
tion and the reduction of non-tariff barriers and has the objective in ‘Phase II’ to liberalise
trade in services.3 The members of the EAC also have initiatives within the EAC to similarly
reduce trade costs.4 In this article, we assess the impacts of deep integration to reduce trade
costs in the Tripartite FTA. In order to assess the relative gains of narrowing or widening the
reforms, we also assess comparable reforms by the members of the EAC applied only within
the EAC and more widely if the EAC unilaterally extends the reforms to all countries, where
feasible.
We decompose trade costs into three categories: costs that can be lowered by trade facili-
tation; non-tariff barriers and the costs of business services. Trade facilitation addresses costs
such as delays at border crossing, roadblocks for trucks and the necessity to pay bribes.
Regarding non-tariff barriers, recent work by Cadot and Gourdon (2014) has shown that
the old command and control non-tariff barrier measures have signiﬁcantly declined, but
standards as barriers to trade have supplanted them in importance. Further, poor business
services for trade are also a problem. Improvements in a wide range of business services
such as banking, insurance, communication and professional services such as legal, auditing,
engineering and computer services would also lower trade costs. This also includes poor trans-
portation services, such as very poor or non-existent freight train services in many countries of
sub-Saharan Africa, delays at ports and poor air freight services in many countries.
In this article, we build a 10 region, 19-sector global trade model. The model contains
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda,5 COMESA, SADC, the USA, EU, China and Rest of
the World. This article is innovative both conceptually and empirically.
Conceptual innovation is that this article is the ﬁrst global trade model to numerically
assess regional liberalisation of barriers against foreign direct investors in services; and it is
also the ﬁrst such model to assess non-discriminatory barriers that apply to both domestic
and foreign service providers.6 The literature now contains a substantial number of good
studies that examine regional agreements in goods. However, given that commitments to
2 Brenton and Isik (2012) have also documented the high costs of trading in sub-Saharan Africa. See also
the estimates of Hummels et al. (2007) and Minor (2013).
3 See http://www.comesa-eac-sadc-tripartite.org/intervention/focal_areas/trade_facilitation, Pearson
(2012) and the East African Business Council progress report at http://www.eabc.info/uploads/
progress_report.pdf.
4 See East African Community (2012), East African Community Secretariat (2011), World Bank (2012), and
Dihel et al. (2010).
5 Due to lack of data, Burundi, the ﬁfth member of the EAC, is not represented as a separate region of our
model.
6 Brown and Stern (2001) and Dee et al. (2003) employ multi-country numerical models with foreign direct
investment in services. Because their models contain only three sectors, agriculture, manufacturing
and services, they are rather stylized and do not assess regional commitments.
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both foreign direct investors in services and cross-border trade in services are crucial elements
of modern FTA agreements negotiated with the EU and the USA, are included in the EAC, and
are proposed in the Tripartite FTA, it is important to have a tool to investigate these services
commitments.
The essential data problem to assess services commitments has been the lack of estimates of
the ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) of the barriers to foreign suppliers of services based on
assessments of the regulatory regimes in place. We developed a new database of the AVEs
of barriers in 11 business services sectors in 103 countries (see Jafari and Tarr, 2015),
which was aggregated to the sectors and regions of this model (Jafari, 2013c). The estimates
of the AVEs were possible due to the newly released World Bank survey information on the
discriminatory regulatory barriers against foreign suppliers of services on these 11 sectors in
103 countries (see Borchert et al., 2014). Many results in the article depend crucially on this
database of AVEs.
In addition, this article builds on or adapts the following three databases: (a) trade facilitation—
the article employs the database on the time in trade costs of Hummels et al. (2007) andMinor
(2013). We aggregate the database to the sectors and regions of our model. Although a central
ﬁnding of the studies by Hummels, Minor and their co-authors is that the AVE of time in trade
varies across products, most computable general equilibrium modelling of trade facilitation
issues have used a single AVE across all products. We show that this more accurate database
impacts the results; (b) foreign afﬁliate sales—we use the ‘Global Database of Foreign Afﬁliate
Sales’ developed by Fukui and Lakatos (2012). In the Tripartite region, we augmented the
database with independent work and (c) estimates of the AVEs of non-tariff measures
(NTMs) developed by Kee et al. (2009).
We ﬁnd that there are substantial gains for all six of our African regions from deep
integration in the Tripartite FTA or comparable unilateral reforms to all countries by the
EAC to reduce trade costs; but our decomposition analysis reveals that the estimated gains
and the magnitudes vary considerably across countries and depend on the reform. Thus,
the regions and countries have very different stakes in the various reforms and would have
an interest in negotiating for different reforms in different agreements. One striking ﬁnding
is that we estimate that Kenya gains less from comparable unilateral liberalisation by the
EAC than from the Tripartite FTA, due in part to an umbrella of protection in services
markets in the Tripartite region. For goods markets, Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1981)
and Harrison et al. (2002) have shown that due to market access, there is the possibility of
larger gains in preferential agreements than from unilateral liberalisation. This extends their
result to services markets.
Karingi and Fekadu (2009), Jensen and Sandry (2011) and Willenbockel (2013) have
executed general equilibrium assessments of the impacts of the Tripartite FTA. They focus
either exclusively or primarily on preferential tariff reductions.7 They ﬁnd small welfare
7 Jensen and Sandry add a 2% uniform reduction in non-tariff barriers on goods and cross-border ser-
vices to preferential tariff reduction. Willenbockel also executes a scenario with a 5% reduction in
border crossing costs for all goods based on unpublished TradeMark South Africa estimates of
border crossing costs; then the estimated gains increase to 0.4% of GDP for the Tripartite region in
aggregate.
Although they do not focus or Eastern or Southern Africa, two other interesting general equilibrium
assessments of trade policy changes in Africa are the following. Anderson et al. (2006) ﬁnd that global
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changes from preferential tariff reduction in the Tripartite FTA, with many countries losing
and net gains of only about 0.1–0.2% of GDP. Our estimates of the impact of tariff changes
are consistent with these earlier studies; but, depending on the country or region, our estimates
of the gains from reductions of trade costs within the Tripartite area are about 10–30 times
larger than their estimated gains of preferential tariff reduction—suggesting very different
stakes.
The article is organised as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of the model. In
Section 3, we explain the data that we have developed or used in constructing this model. The
results are presented in Section 4. Sensitivity analysis is presented in Section 5. In Section 6, we
concludewith a summary of the key results and the stakes of the regions of our model based on
the reform.
2. Overview of the model
This article builds on the algebraic structure of the small open economy models of Rutherford
and Tarr (2008), Jensen and Tarr (2010, 2012) and of Balistreri and Tarr (2011). Here we
provide a general description of the structure described there and provide more details
where we depart from that structure.
The key extension of the earlier models we developed of Armenia, Kenya and Tanzania is
that we adopt a multi-region model, since we want to endogenously account for the ‘market
access’ effects on exports of a reduction of import tariffs by the partner countries. Agreements
to facilitate trade, lower non-tariff barriers or allow access to service providers have market
access effects. Our framework allows us to explicitly evaluate the importance to the regions
in our model of improved market access or reduced trade costs, as well as losses members may
suffer as partner countries may raise export prices to each other.
There are 18 sectors in the model shown in Table 1. The mapping from the 57 sectors in
the GTAP 8.1 dataset to sectors of our model is explained in Appendix A of Balistreri et al.
(2014), hereafter BTY. There are three categories of sectors: (a) four perfectly competitive
goods and services sectors; (b) seven imperfectly competitive goods sectors and (c) seven ser-
vices sectors in which there is imperfect competition and foreign direct investment. The cost,
production and pricing structures in the three categories differ widely, but regardless of sector,
all ﬁrms minimise the cost of production.
Primary factors are skilled labour, unskilled labour, capital (including land)8 and natural
resources. Regarding capital, there is mobile capital and sector-speciﬁc capital in imperfectly
competitive goods sectors and services sectors with FDI; and primary inputs imported by
multinational service providers, reﬂecting specialised management expertise or technology
of the ﬁrm. There is some sector-speciﬁc capital for each imperfectly competitive ﬁrm
free merchandise trade would boost real incomes in sub-Saharan Africa more than proportionately
than in other developing countries; but partial liberalization proposals would capture only a small
share of the gains. Mevel and Karingi (2012) analyse the removal of all tariffs on goods within the
African continent as a whole. They ﬁnd this would increase intra-African trade by 52%, but if trade
facilitation measures are also implemented that reduce the time costs of trade by 50%,
intra-African trade would more than double.
8 Given the nature of the shocks we consider (which are economy-wide), we do not believe the aggre-
gation of capital and land has a signiﬁcant impact on the results.
680 Edward J. Balistreri et al.
(and for ﬁrms in services sectors with FDI) for each region of the model. In the sectors where
there is sector-speciﬁc capital, there are decreasing returns to scale in the use of the mobile
factors and supply curves in these sectors slope up. We calibrate the elasticity of substitution
between sector-speciﬁc capital and other inputs in each sector so that the elasticity of supply of
the ﬁrms is consistent with econometric evidence that indicates that the supply response
depends on the level of development and the technological complexity of the product.9
2.1 Perfectly competitive goods and services sectors
In these sectors, we employ the ‘Armington’ structure, with goods and services differentiated
by the country of origin. Exports are also differentiated by the country of destination.
2.2 Imperfectly competitive goods sectors
For goods produced under imperfect competition, the cost, production and competition struc-
ture for ﬁrms in this group of industries follows Helpman and Krugman (1985). Goods are
differentiated at the ﬁrm level. We assume that manufactured goods may be produced domes-
tically or imported from ﬁrms in any region in the model. Firms set prices using the
Chamberlinian large group monopolistic competition assumption within a Dixit-Stiglitz
framework, which results in constant mark-ups over marginal cost for both foreign ﬁrms
and domestic ﬁrms. Demand in all countries for these goods is characterised by the constant
elasticity of substitution demand function. As the marginal utility of a good goes to inﬁnity
as the quantity goes to zero, if a variety of the good is produced anywhere, some of it will
be consumed in all regions of the model. As in Harrison et al. (1996), we assume that there
Table 1: List of Sectors, Regions and Factors of Production in the Eastern
and Southern Africa Model
Business Services with FDI Dixit-Stiglitz goods
Air transport Chemicals mineral and metal products
Communication Energy and minerals
Insurance Food products
Business Services nec Petroleum and coal products
Financial Services nec Other manufacturing
Transport nec Textile, apparel and leather products
Water transport Wood and paper products
CRTS goods and services Regions





Factors of production SADC
Skilled labour USA
Unskilled labour European Union (EUR)
Capital China
Natural resources Rest of the World (ROW)
9 See Schiff et al. (2002) and Schiff and Wang (2006).
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is a nested demand structure, with ﬁrm level product differentiation under a national nest. Pure
ﬁrm level product differentiation is a special case of this structure where the elasticities of
substitution at both levels are identical. For the impact of varying these elasticities, see
Balistreri and Markusen (2009) and Willenbockel (2004).
Following Krugman (1980), we assume that imperfectly competitive ﬁrms have a ﬁxed cost
of production and that marginal costs are constant with respect to output. Then, suppressing
subscripts for ﬁrms, sectors and regions, total costs are
TCðq; pÞ ¼ q MCð pÞ þ FCð pÞ; ð1Þ
where TC is the total costs,MC is the marginal costs, FC is the ﬁxed costs, q is the output of the
ﬁrm and p is a vector of factor prices. Following the literature (e.g., Helpman and Krugman,
1985), we assume that the input proportions of ﬁxed and marginal costs are identical, from
which it follows that the ratio of ﬁxed to marginal costs is constant. That is, for all ﬁrms
producing under increasing returns to scale (in both goods and services), we have
FCð pÞ=MCð pÞ ¼ k;where k is a constant: ð2Þ
Equations (1) and (2), in the Chamberlinian framework, imply that output per ﬁrm remains
constant, i.e., the model does not produce rationalisation gains or losses. The number of var-
ieties affects the productivity of the use of imperfectly competitive goods based on the standard
Dixit-Stiglitz formulation. The effective cost function for users of goods produced subject to
increasing returns to scale declines in the total number of ﬁrms in the industry. But, since all
countries consume some of any variety that is produced, the number of varieties is determined
by global demand and one country can affect the number of varieties only insofar as it affects
global demand.
2.3 Imperfectly competitive service sectors in which foreign
direct investment occurs
In these services sectors, we observe that some services are provided by foreign service providers
on a cross-border basis analogous to goods supply from abroad. But a large share of business
services is provided by service providers with a domestic presence, both multinational and
local.10 Our model allows for both types of provision of foreign services in these sectors.
The cost, production, demand and competition structure for ﬁrms in this group of indus-
tries follows the same structure as the imperfectly competitive goods ﬁrms with two differ-
ences. The ﬁrst difference is that we allow multinational service ﬁrms to establish a local
presence to compete with local ﬁrms directly. Multinational service ﬁrms produce a home
region speciﬁc variety, which is differentiated from domestic and other home region varieties.
The second difference is that downstream ﬁrms do not experience a productivity increase from
additional varieties, i.e., no variety externality. Given that there are no rationalisation gains or
variety externalities, the model exhibits an equivalence with respect to our policy changes to
one in which all multinationals from a speciﬁc home region are in perfect competition with
each other. That is, it is analogous to the Armington structure, except that production also
takes place in the host country.
10 One estimate puts the world-wide cross-border share of trade in services at 41% and the share of
trade in services provided by multinational afﬁliates at 38%. Travel expenditures 20% and compensa-
tion to employees working abroad 1% make up the difference. See Brown and Stern (2001, Table 1).
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For domestic ﬁrms, costs are deﬁned by the costs of local primary factors and intermediate
inputs. When multinationals service providers decide to establish a local presence, they will
import some of their technology or management expertise. That is, foreign direct investment
generally entails importing specialised foreign inputs. Thus, the cost structure of multina-
tionals differs from national-only service providers. Multinationals incur costs related to
both imported primary inputs and local primary factors, in addition to intermediate factor
inputs. Foreign provision of services differs from foreign provision of goods, because the
service providers use local primary inputs.
For multinational ﬁrms, the barriers to foreign direct investment raise their costs of produc-
tion. The reduction of the barriers lowers these costs, freeing the capital and labour that was
used to overcome the barriers for use elsewhere in the economy. In our central scenario, the
reduction in the constraints on foreign direct investment allows the domestic economy to
capture rent rectangles. In addition, reducing barriers induces foreign entry until proﬁts are
driven to zero, so there are also triangles of efﬁciency gains.
3. Data of the model and evidence for key elasticities
3.1 AVEs of the barriers against foreign suppliers of business services
Our estimates in the services sectors necessitated the development of a new global database of
the AVEs of discriminatory barriers against foreign providers of services. This was possible
only because of the availability of a new World Bank database of survey information on
the discriminatory regulatory barriers in 11 services sectors in 103 countries described in
Borchert et al. (2014).11 Borchert et al. produced ‘Services Trade Restrictiveness Indices,’
but did not transform their indices of the regulatory regimes into AVEs. Our methodology
uses the World Bank database for an assessment of the regulatory regimes, but builds on a
series of studies, supported by the Australian Productivity Commission, to convert assess-
ments of services regulatory regimes into AVEs for all 11 sectors in 103 countries. This
work is documented in Jafari and Tarr (2015). The aggregation to the sectors and regions
of our model is documented in Jafari (2013c). In the cases of Kenya and Tanzania, additional
information was available and the estimates are taken from Jafari (2013a) and Jafari
(2013b).
3.2 Estimates of the AVEs of the costs of time in exporting and importing
In order to estimate the impact of improved trade facilitation, in this article we apply a new
dataset of the time cost of trade based on the path-breaking work of Hummels and Schaur
(2013) and Hummels et al. (2007). Using the estimates of Hummels and his co-authors,
Peter Minor (2013) provided estimates for the regions and products in the GTAP database
on a bilateral basis. We use estimates from Peter Minor, which we aggregate to the sectors
and regions of our model, yielding the cost of trade by product and country on a bilateral
trade basis. Detailed documentation of the steps we have taken and a brief explanation of
the methodology may be found in Appendix C of BTY.
11 In the cases of Kenya and Tanzania, we commissioned new surveys by local law ﬁrms of the regu-
latory regimes in services as a basis of estimating both the non-discriminatory barriers that impact
both domestic and foreign suppliers of services as well as the discriminatory regulatory barriers
against foreign suppliers of services. See Jafari (2013a, b).
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3.3 Estimates of the AVEs for NTMs for the regions of our model
Our estimates of the AVEs of NTMs are based on the estimates of Kee et al. (2009). Building
on Kee et al. (2008), Kee et al. (2009) estimate the AVEs of NTMs for 105 countries at the
6 digit level. These estimates, as well as aggregated estimates for manufacturing and agricul-
ture for the 105 countries, are available on the World Bank Web site.12 An alternate choice of
NTM estimates is Cadot and Gourdon (2014). Although the Kee et al. estimates should be
updated, we choose the Kee et al. dataset due to its acceptance in the literature and the
need to have non-negative estimates of the AVEs.13
The measure we use from Kee et al. is the uniform tariff equivalent that generates the
same level of import value for the country in a given year, based on applied tariffs, which
take into account bilateral trade preferences.14 At the six digit level, the estimates of Kee
et al. are sometimes subject to a substantial margin of error that may lead to misleading
results in a CGE model policy analysis. Consequently, we have chosen to use the aggregated
estimates of Kee et al. at the sector level, i.e., for each country, we have two AVEs for each
country: one AVE of the NTMs in manufacturing and one AVE of the NTMs in agricul-
ture. We then further aggregate these values for 93 countries to the regions of our model.
Details are available in Appendix B of BTY. Where the non-tariff measure has a regulatory
function, we assume that the estimate of Kee et al. is the discriminatory component of the
regulation.
Although the benchmark equilibrium incorporates tariff free trade between partners in free
trade agreements or customs unions, the report of the East African Community (2012) shows
that non-tariff barriers remain a very signiﬁcant problem. Consequently, we assume the AVEs
of the non-tariff barriers apply to all countries.
3.4 Tariff and trade data
Trade data and tariff rates are taken from the GTAP 8.1 database. For tariff rates, GTAP 8.1
uses the third version of the MAcMap-HS6 database, described in Guimbard et al. (2012). In
our benchmark dataset, we assume that free trade is fully implemented within the separate
three regional trade groups EAC, COMESA and SADC. The tariff rates, and other distortion
rates, for all African regions in our model are in BTY, Tables 4a–f.
3.5 Social accounting matrices
The core structural data of the model comes from the GTAP 8.1 dataset.15 Data at the sector
level on value added and its components, exports and imports and by trading partner are
available in BTY.
12 The dataset is available at http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,
contentMDK:22574446~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html.
13 Nonetheless, an anonymous referee of this journal has challenged the methodology of Kee et al., and,
because the estimates of Kee et al. for NTMs are based on data for 2001, they are in need of updating.
As shown in the East African Community (2012), however, non-tariff barriers remain a serious
problem, and we assume that the estimates of Kee et al. remain valid.
14 Speciﬁcally, we take the difference between the Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI) and for
the Tariff-only OTRI (OTRI_T), which gives us the AVE of the NTMs.
15 See https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/default.asp.
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3.6 Share of market captured by foreign direct investors in services
and by cross-border sales of services
For each country or region in our model, it was necessary to calculate the market share of
foreign direct investors by source region in the business services sectors of our model as
well as the share of cross-border services in each of our regions for these seven sectors. For
cross-border sales of services, we use the trade data from the GTAP 8.1 dataset.
Our primary data source for foreign afﬁliate sales is the database developed by Fukui
and Lakatos (2012). Fukui and Lakatos combine Eurostat data for 41 countries with an
econometric model to estimate the missing values and thus produce estimates for all
regions and sectors in the GTAP dataset. For the share of sales in the sector by the host
country, we use the GTAP dataset for total sales in the sector and subtract the total of
foreign afﬁliate sales from total sales to obtain the host country share of sales. In the case
of insurance services in African regions, we used the Axco database (for a complete list of
companies) and publicly available information on ownership shares of companies as our
primary data sources. In the case of telecommunications services in our six African
regions, we used national communications commission data and other publicly available
sources on ownership of companies, taking South Africa as our proxy for SADC. Details
are in Appendices D and E of BTY. In Kenya and Tanzania, professional associations of
lawyers and engineers in these countries provided data on the number of professionals,
both total and non-local. Details and documentation of the calculations for Kenya and
Tanzania are available in Jafari (2014d).
3.7 Key elasticities
Supply elasticities are based on the estimates of Schiff et al. (2002) and Schiff and Wang
(2006); the methodology and additional empirical and theoretical justiﬁcation for the
supply elasticities are provided in Jensen and Tarr (2010). Dixit-Stiglitz elasticities in services
are based on estimates from Broda andWeinstein (2006). Dixit-Stiglitz elasticities in goods are
the estimates of the elasticity of substitution for imports from different regions in the GTAP
dataset.16
Armington elasticities of substitution of domestic for foreign, σ(D, M), are from the GTAP
dataset. Armington elasticities of substitution of imports from different regions, σ(M, M), in
the four CRTS sectors are listed in Table 5. We choose a value of 30 for the elasticities of
substitution for imports from different regions based on the estimates of Riedel (1988),17
but we perform sensitivity analysis on these parameters by substituting GTAP values in
Table 5. The key sector among our four CRTS sectors in Africa is agriculture. For agriculture
in Africa, the values of Riedel are supported by the estimates of Broda et al. (2006) for the
countries in their database that are closest to the countries in our model (Malawi and
16 When derived from gravity models, the estimating equation for Dixit-Stiglitz elasticities is the same as
the estimating equation for σ(M, M) in the Armington model. Compare Hummels (2001) and Hertel et al.
(2007).
17 Riedel estimates the elasticity of demand for exports to be 30. Harrison et al. (1997b, Appendix C) have
shown that in a multi-region Armington trade model, the elasticity of demand for exports = σ(M, M)
minus a positive term that is small; so the elasticity of demand for exports is a close proxy for σ(M, M)
in models of this type.
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Madagascar).18 Our value for σ(M, M) is considerably larger than those found in the GTAP
database, where these elasticities are typically deﬁned by the rule of two: σ(M,M) = 2σ(D, M).
It has been shown, however, that the optimal tariff in a perfectly competitive multi-region
model is slightly larger than {σ(M, M)/[σ(M, M) – 1]}.19 Thus, the optimal tariff rises as
σ(M, M) decreases, and the optimal tariff in the GTAP model is about 15%. The implication
that small countries have this much monopoly power on world markets in which their market
share may be minimal has been a long-standing troubling implication of the Armington
assumption in multi-region trade models. Our choice of σ(M, M) reduces the optimal tariff
considerably.
4. Results: deep integration in Eastern and Southern Africa
As a point of reference to compare with the Tripartite FTA, we ﬁrst consider what is at stake
for the EAC members from narrower deep integration within the EAC alone and wider uni-
lateral liberalisation. As members of a customs union, we assume that the EAC members act
collectively on all actions in our scenarios. In our benchmark equilibriumwe assume that tariff
free trade prevails within each of the three regional groups of the Tripartite area, but the
barriers that lead to high trade costs apply to all countries and regions. In Table 2, we
show the benchmark ad valorem rates of distortion for all barriers we apply in Tanzania.
Comparable tables for the other African regions of our model are available in BTY.
4.1 Deep preferential integration within the East African Community
(‘EAC Central’)
4.1.1 Scenario deﬁnition
We execute several scenarios in our multi-region trade model to assess the impacts of the
reduction in trade costs by Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda as members of the East
African Customs Union. We include a reduction of the AVEs of three types of trade costs:
time costs of trade (trade facilitation); non-tariff barriers and barriers against foreign suppliers
of services. The speciﬁcs and rationale are as follows (see also Table 3).
Trade facilitation: we assume a 20% cut in the AVEs of the time cost of trade within the
EAC; and a 5% cut in these costs for trade with countries outside of the EAC.We take modest
cuts in these barriers for multiple reasons. One reason is that the most efﬁcient countries in the
world have positive time costs of trade. Second, part of the costs is due to infrastructure deﬁ-
ciencies which cannot be addressed through policy alone. There are, however, some collabora-
tive projects and plans among members of the EAC (see East African Community Secretariat,
2011), such as common customs posts, designed to cut the time costs of trade. Since there is
likely a spillover beneﬁt of these measures within the EAC that will cut the time costs of trade
outside of the EAC, we assume cuts in external trade costs as well.
18 Although Broda, Greenﬁeld and Weinstein estimate many three digit agricultural elasticities at less
than 30, there are numerous estimates with elasticities much larger, supporting the higher average
central elasticity. For example higher than 30 elasticity values in Malawi are the following: dairy and
honey products, 103; fruits and nuts, 103; olive oil, 125; cucumbers and mushrooms, 119. In
Madagascar, fruits and nuts, 103; coffee and tea, 77; food containing cocoa, 73.
19 This formula is more complicated when σ(M, M) differs across sectors or regions, but the impact
of lowered values will be the same. See Appendix C to
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Table 2: Benchmark Distortions in Tanzania; Ad Valorem Values in Percentage
Barriers against service providers
Discriminatory Non-discriminatory
Kenya Uganda Rwanda COMESA SADC USA EUR China ROW
Business services
Air transport 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 0.0
Communication 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 3.1
Insurance 37.0 37.0 37.0 37.0 37.0 37.0 37.0 37.0 37.0 17.9
Business services nec 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0
Financial services nec 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 14.7
Transport nec 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Water transport 51.0 51.0 51.0 51.0 51.0 51.0 51.0 51.0 51.0 0.0
Tariff rates on goods Non-tariff
Kenya Uganda Rwanda COMESA SADC USA EUR China ROW Measures
Goods
Chemicals mineral and metal products 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 0.0 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 47.4
Energy and minerals 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.0 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 47.4
Food products 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.4 0.0 13.4 13.4 13.4 13.4 47.4
Petroleum and coal products 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.0 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 47.4
Other Manufacturing 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 0.0 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 47.4
Textile and apparel 0.0 0.0 0.0 29.7 0.0 29.7 29.7 29.7 29.7 47.4
Wood and paper products 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.6 0.0 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 47.4






















Barriers against service providers
Discriminatory Non-discriminatory
Kenya Uganda Rwanda COMESA SADC USA EUR China ROW
Barriers to efﬁcient trade facilitation on exports
Chemicals mineral and metal products 16.2 16.1 14.2 14.0 16.1 12.9 13.7 15.9 16.2
Energy and minerals 9.0 7.6 9.0 9.0 5.4 5.4 8.6 9.0 8.4
Food products 12.6 15.3 16.4 12.1 13.8 7.6 14.7 9.8 13.9
Petroleum and coal products 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9
Other manufacturing 7.8 6.4 13.1 10.2 10.2 9.4 9.3 9.8 9.6
Textile and apparel 5.9 5.7 5.8 5.6 6.3 6.8 7.2 6.6 7.5
Wood and paper products 8.3 15.1 11.2 10.8 9.5 5.8 6.3 4.3 15.2
Agriculture and forestry 14.3 18.2 28.7 12.5 17.6 17.9 15.2 13.1 18.0
Barriers to efﬁcient trade facilitation on imports
Chemicals mineral and metal products 19.9 38.6 58.8 9.2 29.3 4.8 5.9 14.8 13.5
Energy and minerals 11.7 18.9 19.8 4.5 17.3 2.6 3.9 8.2 9.2
Food products 20.7 30.7 27.9 41.9 19.7 4.8 4.8 11.3 10.8
Petroleum and coal products 25.9 41.9 43.9 38.1 36.0 6.0 14.1 18.0 17.8
Other manufacturing 15.1 26.9 42.6 3.4 16.3 2.0 4.1 8.6 8.2
Textile and apparel 6.5 12.8 13.8 5.3 15.0 2.1 3.9 5.9 7.2
Wood and paper products 14.7 17.6 49.9 10.8 33.9 2.6 7.9 9.6 9.7









Non-tariff barriers: we assume a modest 20% cut in the AVE of the non-tariff measures.
Under the auspices of the EAC, the member countries are undertaking collaborative efforts to
reduce non-tariff barriers (see, for example, East African Community, 2012). Non-tariff
measures, however, have become much more subtle in the post-Uruguay Round world.
Most measures have a legitimate regulatory function and distinguishing the legitimate regula-
tions from protective or inefﬁcient regulations is complicated. We elaborate in Section 6.3 on
an approach to reduce these barriers. Consequently, we take a more modest 20% reduction in
the AVE of these barriers.
Barriers on foreign providers of services: we take a 50% cut in these barriers. On 1 July
2010, the EAC adopted a Common Market protocol that called for the free movement of
services within the ﬁve member states, along with the free movement of goods, capital and
labour.20
4.1.2 Aggregate welfare effects of deep preferential integration by the East African
Customs Union
Our aggregate results for Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda are presented in Table 3.
Under the column labelled ‘EAC Central,’ we report our ﬁndings for the impacts of combined
cuts in trade facilitation, non-tariff barriers and services barriers. The welfare gains are pre-
sented as Hicksian equivalent variation (EV) as a percent of consumption. All results in
Table 3 are estimated annual gains that are repeated every year. Thus, if x is the Hicksian EV
as a percent of consumption for 1 year, the present value of the gains into the inﬁnite future are
the equal to x*[(1 + d)/d], where d is the discount rate for future gains. For example, with
d = 7%, the present value of the gains would equal 15 times the values presented in Table 3.
We ﬁnd that all four EAC countries gain from this deep integration, with gains ranging
from a low of 0.9% of consumption in the case of Tanzania to a high of 1.4% of consumption
in the case of Rwanda. Thewelfare impact on COMESA and SADCof deep integration within
EAC is imperceptible. To examine the source of these gains in the EAC, we execute three add-
itional scenarios in which we allow only one of the reforms to be implemented in each case.
4.1.3 Preferential reduction of time in trade costs by EAC
In the case of deep preferential integration within the EAC, the reduction in time in trade costs
constitute the largest share of the gains—about two-thirds of the total gains in the cases of
Kenya and Tanzania, but over 80% of the gains in the cases of Uganda and Rwanda. In all
scenarios shown in Table 3, we assume that all three types of trade barriers consume capital
and labour in the home country. For example, reduction of the time in trade costs by 20%
within the EAC and by 5% for countries outside the EAC leads to freeing up of 20% of the
capital and labour devoted to overcoming the time costs of trade within the EAC on both
imports and exports and 5% of the capital and labour devoted to overcoming the time
costs of trade outside the EAC on both imports and exports. To help interpret the results,
we have calculated the value of the rents recaptured by any of the policies simulated
(see Table 9 of BTY). In the case of improved trade facilitation in the EAC, rents recaptured
as a percent of domestic consumption are 0.37% in Kenya and 0.41% in Tanzania. These are
‘rectangles’ of gains. The reduction of the costs of trade results in an increase in the returns to
20 For the text of the protocol, see http://www.eac.int/commonmarket/index.php. See also Dihel et al.
(2010) for a discussion of liberalization of professional services in East Africa.
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Table 3: Summary of Results: Deep Integration in the East Africa Customs Union (EACU) and Tripartite (results are percentage change from initial equilibrium)































































Time in Trade Costsa Yes Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes No No No
Time in Trade Costsb Yes Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes No No No
Services Liberalizationc Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No No
Services Liberalizationd No No No No Yes Yes No No No No No No
Non-Tariff Barrierse Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes No
Non-Tariff Barriers f No No No No Yes No Yes No No No No No
Tariffg No No No No No No No Yes No No No Yes
Aggregate welfare
Welfare (EV as % of
consumption)
Kenya 0.96 0.66 0.04 0.10 1.81 0.98 0.14 2.88 1.31 1.39 0.24 −0.33
Tanzania 0.95 0.63 0.03 0.17 7.11 1.24 5.06 2.50 1.10 0.13 0.61 0.10
Uganda 1.24 1.13 0.04 0.04 2.79 1.54 0.03 2.62 1.92 0.17 0.13 0.29
Rwanda 1.40 1.21 0.13 0.03 4.95 3.35 0.27 1.81 1.74 0.22 0.06 −0.18
COMESA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.40 0.33 0.99 0.04 −0.04











Kenya 6.08 4.46 0.02 1.04 7.74 2.55 0.46 11.09 6.33 −2.31 1.49 3.80
Tanzania 5.57 2.70 −0.03 1.83 16.65 2.51 10.49 10.76 4.88 0.25 3.36 0.30
Uganda 5.17 4.88 0.02 0.06 7.97 2.96 0.05 25.76 6.86 0.12 0.15 10.97
Rwanda 9.60 8.83 0.17 0.40 20.12 9.92 1.04 12.35 10.92 0.38 0.41 0.76
COMESA −0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.59 1.82 0.85 0.28 0.54
SADC 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 4.05 2.30 0.05 0.12 0.86
Source: Authors’ estimates
a20% reduction within EACU (Tripartite) countries1.
b5% reduction with non-EACU (Tripartite) countries1.
c50% reduction of discriminatory barriers within EACU (Tripartite)1.
d50% multilateral reduction of discriminatory barriers by EACU.
e20% reduction of costs within EACU (Tripartite) countries1.
f20% multiltateral reduction of NTB costs by EACU countries.
g100% removal within the Tripartite regions.
1Reductions apply to the EACU countries or the Tripartite countries depending on whether the scenario is EACU or Tripartite.




















exporting relative to domestic sales and a decrease in the cost of imports relative to domestic
production. As a result, there are also ‘triangles’ of efﬁciency gains from increased trade.
Aggregate trade increases in all four EAC countries, ranging from 2.7% in Tanzania to
8.8% in Rwanda. Rents as a share of the total welfare gain range from 50% in the case of
Uganda to about 83% in the case of Rwanda.
4.1.4 Reduction of non-tariff barriers within the EAC
For Tanzania and Kenya, the next most important source of gains is the reduction of non-tariff
barriers within EAC by 20%. Hicksian EV increases by 0.1% in the case of Kenya and 0.17%
in the case of Tanzania. Unlike improved trade facilitation, in this scenario non-tariff barriers
only result in captured rents on the import value and only on EAC partner country imports.
There are substantially fewer rents affected by the reduction of non-tariff barriers, compared
with trade facilitation. Recaptured rents are equal to 0.016% of consumption for Kenya and
0.218% of consumption in the case of Tanzania. Because the non-tariff barriers are lower in
Uganda and Rwanda, the welfare gains are only 0.04 and 0.03% of consumption, respective-
ly. Analogous to the reduction in trade costs, the reduction of the non-tariff barriers results in
a decrease in the cost of imports relative to domestic production. As a result, there are also
‘triangles’ of efﬁciency gains from increased trade. Trade increases in all four countries,
with the maximum increase of 1.8% in Tanzania.
4.1.5 Preferential reduction of barriers against EAC service providers
Fifty percent preferential liberalisation of services barriers results in gains of 0.04% of con-
sumption in the case of Kenya and 0.03% of consumption in the case of Tanzania. Only in
the case of Rwanda within the EAC are the gains from services liberalisation greater than re-
duction of non-tariff barriers. As with other trade costs, in our central scenario we assume that
it takes domestic capital and labour to overcome the costs of the barriers against foreign pro-
viders of services, both those that supply the domestic markets through FDI and also through
cross-border services. Thus, there are potentially rectangles of recaptured rents from reducing
the barriers on EAC foreign suppliers of services in other EACmarkets. We say potential, since
if there are no sales of services from partner countries initially, there are no rents to be recap-
tured. We calculate that the recaptured rents on FDI and the recaptured rents on cross-border
sales of in services. The recaptured rents on FDI from partner countries in the EAC are equal to
0.026% of consumption in the case of Kenya and 0.006 of consumption in the case of
Tanzania. There are very small ﬂows of cross-border trade in our business services within
EAC, however, so only Rwanda has a positive rent rectangle, when measured at three
digits. With the reduction in the barriers on EAC suppliers of services within EAC, there
are production and consumption efﬁciency gains, which explain the difference between the
total welfare gains and the recaptured rents.
4.2 EAC unilateral liberalisation (‘EAC Liberal’)
The above estimates indicate that there are gains from deep integration within the EAC.With a
combined nominal GDP in 2013 of only about US$121 billion (or US$297 on a purchasing
power parity basis),21 however, the EAC is not a large market, and economic theory indicates
21 In 2013, the International Monetary Fund estimated the nominal GDP of the EAC members as follows
(in billions of US dollars): Kenya, 55; Tanzania, 33.3; Uganda, 22.9; Rwanda, 7.4 and Burundi, 2.7. The
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that there should be substantially greater gains from integrating into the world trading envir-
onment. As a point of reference, in the scenario labelled ‘EAC Liberal,’ we assess the extent of
these larger gains from unilateral extension by the EAC of the reforms to lower trade costs.
4.2.1 Scenario deﬁnition
In EAC Liberal, we extend the liberalisations of non-tariff barrier and services barriers imple-
mented in ‘EAC Central’ to all trading partners in the world. In the case of the time in trade
costs, we assume the EAC countries implement equivalent reforms to those in the EAC Deep
Integration scenario to reduce the time in trade; but we do not extend these outside of the EAC
on the grounds that the improvements that can be made are primarily regional and reciprocal
and we already convey a 5% cut in these barriers for countries outside of the EAC. In Table 3,
the results and policy changes are listed.
We see that for Kenya and Uganda, the gains are about twice as large; for Rwanda the
gains increase substantially from 1.4 to 4.95% of consumption. The biggest increase in
welfare is for Tanzania; the welfare gain dramatically increases from 0.95% of consumption
to 7.11% of consumption. We decompose the EAC Liberal scenario to explain the differences
across the EAC countries.
In the case of Tanzania, the big increase in welfare is clearly due to the broader liberalisa-
tion of non-tariff barriers. The wider liberalisation of non-tariff barriers results in a welfare
gain of more than 5% of consumption, whereas the welfare gains were only 0.17% of con-
sumption in the EACCentral case. This large increase is explained by two factors: (a) as shown
in Table 2, the AVEs of the non-tariff barriers in Tanzania are 47.4% in manufacturing and
22.2% in agriculture. This is substantially higher than the estimates for the other African
countries or regions in our model; and (b) on a trade-weighted basis, 84.7% of Tanzania’s
trade is with countries outside of the EAC. Thus, the reduction of NTB barriers impacts a
much larger share of trade, generating more recaptured rents and greater efﬁciency gains.
The other country in EAC to see much larger gains is Rwanda, but in the case of Rwanda it
is due to wider services liberalisation. For Rwanda, that the AVEs of the non-tariff barriers are
less than 5%, so the gains fromNTB liberalisation are much smaller than in Tanzania. But the
AVEs of barriers to foreign service providers are substantial, with four sectors having AVEs of
between 25 and 62%. Our dataset on foreign share of services markets (see Table 6d of BTY)
shows that the market share of EAC services ﬁrms in Rwanda is zero except of Kenyan insur-
ance ﬁrms; but there is substantial foreign presence in Rwandan services from the EU, USA
and ROW (with SADC having a presence in the Rwandan telecommunications and insurance
sectors); so the broader liberalisation has a much larger impact.
4.3 The Tripartite Free Trade Area
4.3.1 Scenario deﬁnition
The Second Tripartite Summit in June 2011 envisioned liberalisation of trade in goods and
movement of business persons in Phase I and, in Phase II, liberalisation of trade in services
and related trade areas. Programmes of trade and transport facilitation and NTB removal
have been launched.22
purchasing power parity GDP, however, was estimated by the IMF at: Kenya, 125.8; Tanzania, 84.9;
Uganda, 61.9; Rwanda, 17.4 and Burundi, 7.9.
22 See Pearson (2012) and Willenbockel (2013) for details.
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In our Tripartite preferential liberalisation scenario, we assume all six of our
Tripartite-African regions (Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, COMESA and SADC)
execute identical preferential liberalisation of the time costs of trade, non-tariff barriers and
services liberalisation as we implemented in the EAC Central scenario, except that the prefer-
ences apply throughout the Tripartite region. In addition, where positive tariffs exist in our
benchmark dataset among the Tripartite-African regions in our model, we execute a
removal of tariffs. We assume free trade within the EAC, COMESA and SADC regions
separately in our benchmark. So the tariff changes only apply to the countries that previously
did not apply free trade. Take Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda as examples. These three countries
are members of the EAC and COMESA. So this implies there will be no change in tariffs
among these three countries and no change between these three countries and COMESA.
But there will be a reciprocal removal of tariffs between Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda and
SADC countries that were not members of COMESA. In order to assess the relative import-
ance of each of the four components of the Tripartite scenario, we execute four additional
scenarios, where each of the three trade costs components is liberalised separately, and we
also simulate preferential tariff reduction alone. The speciﬁc policy changes and results are
summarised in Table 3.
4.3.2 Aggregate welfare results
For all four EAC countries, the aggregate welfare gains from deep integration in the Tripartite
area are larger than deep integration within the EAC alone—ranging from 1.81% of con-
sumption for Rwanda to 2.88% of consumption for Kenya. Gains for COMESA and
SADC while substantial are signiﬁcantly smaller than for the EAC countries, at 1.4 and
1.1% of consumption, respectively. While the gains for Rwanda and Tanzania fall consider-
ably relative to EAC Liberal (or unilateral), interestingly, in the case of Kenya, the gains are
larger in the Tripartite FTA than in ‘EAC Liberal.’ These results provide a partial rationale for
why the Kenyan authorities are among the strongest supporters of Tripartite deep integration.
We conduct decomposition analysis to determine the reasons for these differences.
4.3.3 Trade facilitation only results
The ‘only trade facilitation’ scenario shows that a signiﬁcant part of the explanation for the
larger gains for the EAC countries in the Tripartite FTA is the greater reduction in the time
costs of trade. Because the larger reductions in the AVE of the time costs of trade extend to
COMESA and SADC, there are additional captured rents and efﬁciency gains from thewiden-
ing of the trade facilitation reforms. The simulation results reveal two aspects of the gains from
trade facilitation that are not obvious.
First, for the COMESA and SADC regions, we can see that despite the fact that the reduc-
tion in the time costs of trade is an important contributor to the gains, the gains for COMESA
and SADC (of 0.3 and 0.6% of consumption, respectively) are considerably less than for
the four EAC countries. The reason is that the COMESA and SADC regions trade much
more intensively with countries outside of the Tripartite region, where we assume there
are fewer opportunities for reductions in time in trade costs. The trade-weighted import inten-
sities of goods trade with regions outside of the Tripartite region are as follows: Kenya,
86.7%; Tanzania, 84.7%; Uganda, 70.7%; Rwanda, 63.1%; COMESA, 97.6%; and
SADC, 99.3%.
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Second, despite wider liberalisation in the EAC Liberal scenario, the trade facilitation gains
for the EAC countries are larger in the Tripartite scenario than they are in the EAC Liberal
scenario. This is because of our assumption that the trade facilitation reforms, such as road
and border crossing improvements, disproportionately reduce the costs of the local countries
implementing the reforms. Our Tripartite scenariowidens the regions towhich the larger 20%
cuts apply, but the EAC Liberal scenario applies a 5% cut in these costs on trade outside of the
EAC. This is part of the explanation for Kenya gaining more in the Tripartite scenario than in
EAC Liberal.
4.3.4 Services liberalisation within the tripartite FTA
In the case of preferential liberalisation of services alone, the gains for the EAC countries are
slightly larger than EAC alone, but very signiﬁcantly reduced compared with widening the
service market opening embodied in the EAC Liberal scenario (Kenya is an important excep-
tion as discussed below). This is due to the relatively low market shares of partner countries in
the services sectors of the Tripartite countries. The Rwanda case is the most extreme. For
Rwanda, the gains from services liberalisation increase from 0.22% of consumption under
the Tripartite scenario to 3.35% of consumption under EAC Liberal. As explained above,
the AVEs of discriminatory barriers to foreign service providers are substantial in Rwanda.
But the main foreign service suppliers in Rwanda’s are European Union suppliers followed
by the USA and Rest of the World. COMESA’s share in Rwanda’s service markets is zero
and SADC is represented in Rwanda only in telecommunications (36%) and insurance
(4%). So liberalisation of services markets by Rwanda in the Tripartite FTA yields additional
services suppliers and gains from COMESA and SADC only in telecommunications and
insurance.
Two regions gain substantially from services liberalisation within the Tripartite FTA. One
is Kenya, which, possibly surprisingly, gains more in the Tripartite ‘only services liberalisa-
tion’ scenario than in the EAC Liberal ‘only services liberalisation’ scenario (1.39 versus
0.98% of consumption). The reason is that Kenya has a signiﬁcant share of the insurance
markets in COMESA, where we estimate a very high AVE of the barriers to services providers
(prices about double estimated unconstrained prices). The improvedmarket access for Kenyan
insurance suppliers under the protected umbrella of very high barriers creates substantial
gains for insurance services suppliers from Kenya in COMESA markets. We veriﬁed this
explanation by executing a scenario in which we preferentially liberalise services barriers
within the Tripartite area, but exclude preferential reduction in insurance services barriers.
In this scenario, the estimated gains to Kenya from ‘only services liberalisation’ within
Tripartite fall dramatically from 1.39 to 0.2% of consumption. The theory paper of
Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1981) emphasised that improved market access in export
markets of goods could lead to preferential trade agreements dominating unilateral trade
liberalisation; and this was demonstrated by Harrison et al. (2002) for goods. Our result
for Kenya extends those earlier results in goods to market access in services and shows that
preferential agreements can yield larger gains than unilateral liberalisation due to market
access gains.
The other region that reaps substantial gains from services reform in the Tripartite area is
COMESA. This is explained by the high services barriers in COMESA, especially in insurance,
yielding large rent capture from liberalisation, and efﬁciency gains from better access to
relatively efﬁcient services suppliers.
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4.3.5 NTB liberalisation
The key result is that the EAC countries have a lot more to gain fromNTB liberalisation in the
Tripartite FTA than does COMESA or SADC. For Uganda and Kenya, possibly surprisingly,
they gain more from preferential NTB liberalisation in the Tripartite FTA than from equiva-
lent unilateral liberalisation of EAC Liberal scenario. Similar to Kenya in services liberalisa-
tion, improved market access in goods is the explanation. Uganda’s (Kenya’s) AVEs of NTBs
are estimated to be a 3.9 (14.6)% in agriculture and zero (0.3%) in goods. So that explains the
low gains for Kenya and even lower for Uganda from unilateral liberalisation in EAC Liberal.
But the EAC countries obtain preferential market access in COMESA (which has AVEs of agri-
cultural and manufacturing NTBs of 27.5 and 20.1%, respectively) and SADC, with 4.5%
AVEs of agricultural NTBs. On the other hand, for Tanzania, since 84.7% of Tanzanian
goods trade is with countries outside of Eastern and Southern Africa and they have the
highest AVEs of NTBs among our regions (see Table 2 and BTY), the gains under EAC
Liberal from NTB liberalisation are about eight times larger than under the Tripartite FTA.
For COMESA and SADC, the gains are negligible from a cut in the AVEs of the NTBs. This
is because only 2.4% for COMESA and 0.7% for SADC of their trade is with each other or
the EAC countries.
4.3.6 Preferential tariff removal
Results for the preferential tariff changes in the Tripartite FTA show some regions obtain
small gains and some obtain small losses, with SADC and Uganda as the main gainers.
These results are consistent with economic theory, which indicates that welfare impacts
from preferential tariff changes are ambiguous due to the possibility of trade diversion dom-
inating,23 and with prior CGE analyses of tariff changes in the Tripartite FTA. Jensen and
Sandrey (2011), Willenbockel (2013) and Karingi and Fekadu (2009) all ﬁnd small welfare
changes. They ﬁnd that South Africa is the principal gainer from preferential tariff removal,
with losses for a signiﬁcant share of the remaining countries in the Tripartite region. We also
ﬁnd that Uganda gains from the tariff changes within the Tripartite region. One reason is that
agriculture exports account for about 19% of Ugandan exports, but due to its product mix,
they face 32% tariffs in SADC; these are the highest tariffs applied by SADC on only sector or
any region in our model. So there are signiﬁcant market access gains for Uganda on agricul-
tural exports in SADC.
4.3.7 Sector impacts: diverse impacts of trade facilitation
Previous efforts at simulating sector output and export changes from trade facilitation used
uniform AVEs across sectors, which led to more uniform impacts across sectors. Our
dataset has the time costs of trade varying by both product and by country or origin and des-
tination,24 which yields more diverse estimates of the impacts on output and exports of trade
facilitation. The dataset is important in explaining results for Uganda. One of the Ugandan
sectors with the highest AVE of the time costs of exporting (importing) is agricultural pro-
ducts, where the Ugandan AVE is about 40 (30)%, depending on the destination (origin)
23 More accurately, the tariff loss from the reduction of trade with excluded countries could dominate
the efﬁciency gains on increased trade with partner countries. But as we have emphasized, market
access gains must also be included in the calculation.
24 Due to the product mix differences across countries of the aggregated sectors of our model.
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country.25 Consequently, from trade facilitation, we estimate an expansion of agricultural
output and exports in Uganda relative to other sectors in Uganda (see BTY for sector
output and export changes in all regions of our model). The reduction of time costs of
trade on agricultural exports allows Uganda to more effectively capitalise on the improved
market access opportunities presented by the preferential market access in SADC afforded
by the Tripartite FTA.
4.4 Adjustment costs and the political economy of regional trade liberalisation
We ﬁnd that, in general, preferential trade liberalisation (tariff or NTB reduction) results in sub-
stantially muted output changes at the sector level compared with unilateral liberalisation. Take
Tanzania as an example (which has the highest AVEs of its NTBs in our dataset). The gains from
unilateral reduction of NTB barriers alone are about 25 times greater than the gains from lib-
eralisation within EAC alone. But, the maximum output decline at the sector level from NTB
liberalisation within EAC alone is 2%, but with unilateral liberalisation, we estimate output de-
clines of 9.5% for textiles and apparel, 11.8% for other manufacturing and 13.8% for wood
and paper products. Thus, although the welfare gains of preferential liberalisation are dramat-
ically smaller than unilateral liberalisation, the adjustment costs are also smaller.
To illustrate, we quantify the adjustment costs estimate for Tanzania, by adopting the un-
employed resources measure of the social costs of adjustment of a trade policy change.26 Let
w = the annual wage rate; L = the total labour force; ΔL = the number of workers who are
displaced by the trade policy change; β = ΔL/L = the share of the labour force that is displaced
by the trade policy change; µ = the share of one year that a displaced worker is unemployed
and X = the loss of output due to the displacement of ΔL workers. Then, if @Y=@L; the
marginal product of labour, is equal to wages, we have that X is given by Equation (3)
@Y
@L
 ΔL  μ ¼ w  ΔL  μ ¼ X: ð3Þ
Tanzanian national statistics indicate that labour receives 60.4% of GDP.27 Then
w = 0.604*GDP/L; substituting for w in Equation(3) and dividing by GDP, we have that
the social costs of adjustment as a share of GDP are shown by Equation (4)
0:604  β  μ ¼ X=GDP: ð4Þ
We calculate Equation (4) for Tanzania for our three principal scenarios. Regarding β, in our
model simulations, we estimate the number of workers that must change jobs by sector and
skill type. Taking a weighted average across all sectors and skill types of labour for Tanzania,
we calculate that: β = 0.0049 for the EAC Central scenario; β = 0.0117 for the EACU Liberal
scenario and β = 0.0146 for the Tripartite scenario. That is, in the EAC Central scenario, we
estimate that about one-half of 1% of labour must change jobs, and between 1 and 1.5 % of
labour must change jobs in the other two scenarios.28
25 The partner country AVE is also relevant in assessing impacts.
26 For an explanation of the methodology, see Morkre and Tarr (1980, Chapter 3) or Matusz and Tarr
(2000).
27 This is the sum of compensation for subsistence labour (that receives 29.8% of value added) and all
other categories of labour (which receive 30.6%). See Jensen et al. (2010).
28 The Tripartite scenario contains preferential tariff reduction, whereas the EAC Liberal scenario does
not any tariff changes; this explains the larger adjustment costs for the Tripartite scenario.
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For µ, the Tanzanian National Panel Surveys of 2010 and 2011 found that national
unemployment was rather low at 2.5% in 2010 and 3.3% in 2011.29 Nonetheless, the
Integrated Labour Force Survey reported that the national average duration of unemployment
is rather high at 1.24 years,30 i.e., µ = 1.24. Then, from Equation (4), the social costs of adjust-
ment, as a percent of GDP, are presented in row 1 of Table 4.
In Table 3, we have EV as a percent of private consumption. To compare with adjustment
costs in Equation (4), we need EV as a percent of GDP. Private consumption in Tanzania in
2012 was 66% of GDP.31 Converting the estimates in Table 3, we have EV as a percent of
GDP for one year as shown in row 3 of Table 4.
Crucially, adjustment costs are a once and for all cost, whereas the gains from the trade
policy change continue into the inﬁnite future. Taking the present value of the gains into
the inﬁnite future with a 7% discount rate for future gains, the gains from our three principal
scenarios, as a percent of GDP, are shown in row 4 of Table 4. Then, the ratios of the gains to
the adjustment costs from the trade policy change are shown in row 5 of Table 4 as
EAC Central ¼ 26:0; EAC Liberal ¼ 81:5; Tripartite ¼ 23:0:
These results are consistent with the evidence from empirical studies, summarised by Matusz
and Tarr (2000), which has shown that the adjustment costs of trade liberalisation are dramat-
ically smaller than the welfare gains.32 However, policy-makers often receive strong lobbying
from those who suffer adjustment costs from trade liberalisation, while those who gain are
more diverse or may not realise they will gain from trade liberalisation; so the gainers typically
do not lobby for liberalisation or lobby much less vigorously. Thus, these results explain some
of the appeal of regional liberalisation to policy-makers, despite the usually larger net gains of
broader unilateral or multilateral liberalisation.
4.5 Reduction of non-discriminatory barriers in services in Kenya and Tanzania
We also assessed the impacts in Kenya and Tanzania, of reform of domestic regulations that
impose costs on both domestic and foreign suppliers of business services in a non-discriminatory
manner. We estimate that a 50% reduction of the AVEs of the non-discriminatory barriers to
suppliers of services in Kenya (Tanzania) results in gains in Hicksian EV in Kenya equal to
1.4% of domestic consumption and equal to 2.2% of domestic consumption in the case of
Tanzania. This exceeds the gains from the 5% reduction in discriminatory barriers in the
EAC Liberal scenario, where Kenya is seen to gain 1% of consumption and Tanzania gains
1.2%. Thus, while the discriminatory barriers are important and are the focus of international
negotiation, the regulatory barriers that impose costs on domestic suppliers and foreign sup-
pliers of services in a non-discriminatory manner are quantitatively more important in these
cases.
The larger gains from the reduction of non-discriminatory barriers are due to the larger
base from which the barriers are reduced. The non-discriminatory barriers affect all providers
of services, so the base of the recaptured rents and the distortion triangle are larger.
29 See National Bureau of Statistics of Tanzania (2013b, p. 18).
30 Calculated from data in National Bureau of Statistics of Tanzania (2011, Table 6.14).
31 National Bureau of Statistics of Tanzania (2013b, pp. 36, 37).
32 Matusz and Tarr (2000) summarize the evidence on the adjustment costs of trade liberalization.
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5. Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we assess the impact of parameter values and the key modelling assumption of
rent capture on the results. Through our ‘piecemeal sensitivity analysis’, we will determine the
most important parameters for the results, and we will assess how important the rent capture
assumption is for the results. We examine the three aggregate policy scenarios: EAC Deep
Integration, Tripartite FTA with Deep Integration and EAC Unilateral Liberalisation. Our
results are presented in Table 5.
5.1 Impact of rent capture assumption
In our central scenarios, we assume that it takes capital and labour to overcome the barriers;
the rents from the barriers are ‘dissipated’ and the rents are recaptured by the domestic
economy in the central scenarios. It is possible, however, that some of the barriers are
not dissipated, but instead generate rents that are captured by domestic agents in our
initial equilibrium. If so, then the rents that are captured initially by domestic agents
would not be available as a net welfare gain since they are a loss to domestic agents; and
the welfare analysis for rents is analogous to tariff loss. The ‘triangle’ of efﬁciency gains
will remain, but the welfare gains should be smaller when there are initial rents captured
by domestic agents.
In Table 5, the row labelled θr represents the share of rents captured initially by domestic
agents. We only display results for Tanzania; tables of results for the other ﬁve African regions
of our model are available in BTY. We retain all other modelling and parameter assumptions,
but allow the initial rent capture share to be either zero (central value) or one (upper value).
For three of our African regions, the welfare gains do not change dramatically. For Kenya
and Uganda, in the cases of deep integration within EAC or the Tripartite FTA, the estimated
gains fall to about 95% of their level with rent capture. The gains fall by 12% for SADC in the
Tripartite FTA scenario. This reﬂects low levels of Kenyan and Ugandan trade in goods and in
services with these regions and hence low available rents. Recall that a substantial share of
the Kenyan gains from the Tripartite FTA come from improved market access in COMESA
services markets and it is COMESA not Kenya that gains from the capture of these rents.
But the welfare gains to Kenya fall by more than 50% in the case of EAC liberal. This reﬂects
large available rents in the case of services and non-tariff barriers in trade with regions outside
of Africa.
Table 4:Adjustment Costs Estimates and Beneﬁt–Cost Calculations for Tanzania’s Three Principal
Trade Policy Options
EAC central EAC liberal Tripartite
1. Adjustment costs as % of GDP 0.37 0.88 1.09
2. EV as % of consumption 0.95 7.11 2.5
3. EV as % of GDP 0.62 4.67 1.64
4. Present value of EV as % of GDP1 9.5 71.5 25.1
5. Beneﬁt–cost ratio (row 4 divided by row 1) 26 81.5 23
Source: Authors’ calculations.
1Seven percent discount factor into the inﬁnite future. Row 4 = (Row 3) * [1.07/.07].
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On the other hand, the estimated gains fall considerably in the cases of Tanzania and
COMESA. Table 5 shows that in the case of Tanzania, the welfare gains fall to about
60–70% of their original level in the case of EAC Deep Integration or Tripartite FTA scen-
arios. In the case of EAC unilateral liberalisation, however, the welfare fall is dramatic—
from more than 7% of consumption to about 1% of consumption, deriving mostly from
the lack of capture of the large rents that are impacted by unilateral liberalisation of NTBs
in Tanzania. For COMESA in the Tripartite FTA, the gains fall from 1.4 to 0.5% of consump-
tion due to no rent capture in services. Results for Rwanda are between Kenya and Tanzania in
terms of percentage reduction of the gains due to initial rent capture, but the pattern of a much
stronger drop in the percentage of gains in the unilateral liberalisation scenario prevails due to
no capture of rents in services liberalisation.
5.2 Piecemeal sensitivity analysis (other than rent capture)
We see that central results are rather robust with respect to most of the parameters. In the cases
of the Tripartite FTA and EAC Deep Integration, the parameter that has the strongest impact
on the results is the elasticity of substitution between ﬁrm varieties in imperfectly competitive
goods sectors, σ(qi, qj), as welfare estimates can vary up to about 114% of their central values,
depending on the country and scenario. Following from the Le Chatelier principle, larger elas-
ticities typically lead to larger welfare gains in response to welfare improving reforms, as the
economy can adapt more readily. In the case of this parameter, however, there are offsetting
impacts. Lower values of this elasticity imply that varieties are less close to each other, so add-
itional varieties are worth more. Thus, theory is ambiguous regarding the impact of this par-
ameter. The elasticity of substitution between imports from different regions in CRTS sectors,
σ(M, M), has a modest impact on welfare, but a more substantial impact on imports in some
sectors. Larger elasticities allow substitution towards the most efﬁcient supplier at domestic
prices, and, with one exception, the welfare gains are larger for Tanzania, Uganda and
Rwanda in all three scenarios, as expected. In the case of EAC Deep Integration, however,
there is a preference-induced substitution away from non-EAC suppliers and trade diversion
slightly dominates in the cases of Kenya and Tanzania. Further, for Kenya, there is a terms of
trade loss that dominates the results and slightly lowers the welfare gain in the EAC Liberal
scenario. Regarding trade, however, the difference in aggregate exports can be substantial,
especially in percentage terms in the Tripartite scenario. For Kenya (Uganda), aggregate
exports increase by 9.5 (19.3)% with the GTAP elasticities, but 11.1 (25.8)% with our
central values. In the case of agriculture exports, the percentage differences are more substan-
tial: for our six African regions, with GTAP elasticities, agricultural exports increase from
between 3 and 26%, depending on the country. But with our central elasticities, estimated
agricultural exports increase by ﬁve to eleven times more.
For each region, we have a vector of elasticities of ﬁrm supply with respect to price for
imperfectly competitive goods and services sectors. In the EAC Liberal case, the welfare
gains are about 5% larger in Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda with larger elasticities of ﬁrm
supply.33
33 In Tanzania the gains are approximately unchanged. If available varieties in IRTS goods fall, the
welfare gain is smaller. In the EAC Deep Integration case, possible trade diversion leads to ambiguous
results.
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Table 5: Piecemeal Sensitivity Analysis: Impact on Tanzania of EAC Deep Integration, Tripartite FTA Deep Integration and EAC Unilateral Liberalisation
Parameter EV as a % of consumption
Parameter value EAC deep integration EAC Liberal Tripartite integration
Lower Central Upper Lower Central Upper Lower Central Upper Lower Central Upper
σ(qi, qj)—services sectors 2 3 4 0.95 0.95 0.95 7.13 7.11 7.11 2.51 2.50 2.49
σ(qi, qj)—goods sectors See below 0.85 0.95 1.06 6.76 7.11 7.64 2.13 2.50 2.96
σ(va, bs) 0.625 1.25 1.875 0.95 0.95 0.95 7.08 7.11 7.14 2.50 2.50 2.50
σ(D, M) See below 0.94 0.95 0.95 7.10 7.11 7.13 2.48 2.50 2.52
σ(M, M) GT AP values 30 0.98 0.95 NA 7.04 7.11 NA 2.37 2.50 NA
σ(L, K) 0.5 1 1.5 0.95 0.95 0.95 7.12 7.11 7.11 2.51 2.50 2.50
σ(A1, . . . ,An) 0 0 0.25 NA 0.95 0.95 NA 7.11 7.14 NA 2.50 2.51
ɛEACU, ɛCOMESA, ɛSADC Lower (upper) values are
0.5 (1.5) central values
0.97 0.95 0.93 7.10 7.11 7.09 2.54 2.50 2.48
ɛEU, ɛROW, ɛUSA, ɛCHINA
θr = share of rents captured 0 0 1 NA 0.95 0.68 NA 7.11 1.05 NA 2.50 1.59
θm 0.025 0.05 0.075 0.95 0.95 0.95 7.11 7.11 7.11 2.50 2.50 2.50
σ(qj, qj)—IRTS goods Parameter value σ(D, M)—CRTS sectors Parameter value
Chemicals and metals 3.4 6.8 10.2 Lower Central Upper
Energy and minerals 5.8 11.6 17.4 Agriculture and forestry 1.3 2.5 3.8
Food products 2.6 5.1 7.7 Other services 0.8 1.5 2.3
Petroleum and coal prod. 2.1 4.2 6.3 Trade 0.8 1.5 2.3
Other manufacturing 3.9 7.7 11.6 Utilities 1.4 2.8 4.2
Textiles, apparel and leather 3.8 7.6 11.4
Wood and paper products 3.2 6.3 9.5
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Key: σ(qj, qj): elasticity of substitution between ﬁrm varieties in imperfectly competitive sectors; σ(va, bs): elasticity of substitution between value-added and business services; σ(D,M): elasticity of
substitution between domestic goods and imports in CRTS sectors; σ(M, M): elasticity of substitution between imports from different regions in CRTS sectors; σ(L, K): elasticity of substitution
between primary factors of production in value added; σ(A1,. . .An): elasticity of substitution in intermediate production between composite Armington aggregate goods; ɛROW, ɛEU, ɛCHINA, ɛUSA
ɛEACU, ɛCOMESA, and ɛSADC: vectors of elasticities of imperfectly competitive ﬁrms’ supply in the Rest World, EU, China. USA, EACU, COMESA and SADC with respect to the price of their





















6.1 Overall gains by region
In this article, we have estimated the impact of reducing non-tariff barriers, improving trade
facilitation and reducing services costs in the EAC, the Tripartite FTA and unilaterally by the
EAC.We estimate that deep integration within the EAC alone will produce signiﬁcant beneﬁts
for its members, but if expanded to include COMESA and SADC in a Tripartite deeply inte-
grated FTA, it would substantially increase the beneﬁts for our EAC countries. We ﬁnd that
SADC and COMESA would gain substantially from the Tripartite FTA, but their gains are
about one-half the gains of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda from deep integration within the
Tripartite FTA. Tanzania and Rwanda gain dramatically more from unilateral liberalisation
rather than preferential liberalisation, but Kenya gains less from EAC Liberal (Unilateral) than
from the Tripartite FTA.
6.2 Sources of gains by region
Our decomposition analysis reveals the reasons for these differences: (a) the augmented gains
from reduction in time in trade costs in the Tripartite FTA are an important reason for the
increase in gains to the EAC countries relative to deep integration within the EAC alone.
These trade facilitation gains for the EAC countries are larger than in the unilateral liberalisa-
tion scenario; (b) SADC and COMESA gain both from trade facilitation and from non-tariff
barrier reduction in the Tripartite region, but considerably less than the EAC countries since
they have very high trade intensities with regions outside of the Tripartite region; (c) for both
Tanzania and Rwanda, EAC Liberal (Unilateral) by far yields the largest gains, but for differ-
ent reasons. For Tanzania, it gains from the reduction of NTBs outside of the Tripartite region.
For Rwanda, it is better access to non-Tripartite foreign services providers. But unilateral
liberalisation leads to larger adjustment costs for both Tanzania and Rwanda. Within the
Tripartite FTA, trade facilitation is the reform that is most important to both countries; (d)
Uganda has the most at stake within the Tripartite area in trade facilitation. It would gain sub-
stantially from EAC Liberal due to better access to foreign service suppliers; (e) consistent with
earlier estimates, our assessment of the gains in the Tripartite FTA shows negligible impacts
from tariff changes, with losses for some members. Schiff andWinters (2003) have found that
the largest gains from regional integration come from the deep aspects of the agreements, so
our results are consistent with the broader empirical and theoretical literature.
The Kenya case is especially interesting because it gains more from the Tripartite FTA than
from unilateral liberalisation by the EAC in all three dimensions of our trade costs. We
explained these results due to better market access under a protected regional umbrella and
the logistics of trade facilitation reform. This extends the Wonnacott and Wonnacott
(1981) result to services. Our results provide a rationale for the strong support of the
Tripartite FTA by the Kenyan authorities.
6.3 Policies to reduce non-tariff barriers and services costs
and to improve trade facilitation
Cadot and Gourdon (2014) have shown that the old command and control non-tariff mea-
sures such as quotas, bans and licenses have signiﬁcantly declined in importance; but sanitary
and phyto-sanitary (SPS) regulations and standards as technical barriers to trade (TBTs) have
become the new non-tariff measures that restrict trade. SPS regulations and standards on
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industrial goods, however, have legitimate regulatory functions. For example, in the case of
SPS, countries have the right and obligation to protect human, animal and plant life. The
World Trade Organisation SPS and TBT agreements recognise these legitimate regulatory
functions, but call for these regulations to be applied in a manner that does not discriminate
against imports.34 Similarly, there are legitimate regulatory functions in many services areas
such as banking, insurance and telecommunications; these regulations are a problem when
they are applied in a discriminatory manner or impose excessive costs.
Given the importance for developing countries of reducing trade costs, global experts in the
ﬁeld of non-tariff measures, trade facilitation and services (including the World Bank, the
International Trade Centre, the Asian Development Bank and the World Economic Forum.
(2013))35 recommend establishing an effective regulatory review and improvement mechan-
ism. Crucially, there should be public–private partnerships that involve the active engagement
of the business community, economic policy ofﬁcials and regulators organised around the
supply chain as a whole in a sector or area of trade. The process would be overseen by a
focal point within government with a mandate to coordinate and oversee all regulation that
directly affects supply chain efﬁciency. To be effective in reducing trade costs requires coher-
ence and coordination across many government agencies and collaboration with industry. The
process should generate information on sources of trade costs through regular assessments of
regulatory trade barriers and costs, and concrete action agendas and proposals for reforms.
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